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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF

Plaintiff and
Responoent,

Case No. 19184

vs.
H~ATHER

S. AMICONE,
Defendant and
Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of
the mandatory seven day sentencing provision of the State's
obscenity statute, Section 76-10-1204 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THF LOWER COURT
The appellant-Amicone pleaded guilty in Fifth Circuit Court
to a charge of knowingly distributing obscene material in
violation of the State's pornography statute, Section 76-10-1204,
Utah Code Ann.,

1953, as amended.

After pleading quilty,

the Appellant-Amicone appealed her

rnnviction to the District Court.
Wilkinson
~nowlingly

affi~ed

The Honorable Homer F.

Appellant-Amicone's plea of guilty to

di~tributing

pornographic material, and the seven day

jail sentence imposed by the Circuit rourt.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Respondent, State of Utah, seeks to have this
Court uphold the constitutionality of the sentencing provisions
of the State's obscenity statute and affirm the sentence of the
Appellant-Amicone.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The State of Utah,

by and through the State's Attorney

General, has requested the assistance of Salt Lake City in
response to this appeal by A?pellant.

(See letter of the

Attorney General attached as Appendix "A").
The thrust of appellant's argument on appeal is that the
minimum seven day mandatory jail sentence required for those who
knowingly distribute obscene material is unconstitutional.

The

statute provides:
"Fach separate offense under this section is a
class A misdemeanor punishable by a minimum
mandatory fine of not less than $100 plus $10 for
each article exhibited up to the maximum allowed
by law and by incarceration, without suspension of
sentence in any way, for a term of not less than
seven days, notwithstanding any provisions of
section 77-35-17." Section 76-10-1204(2) Utah
Code Ann.
Appellant-Amicone alleges that this statute constitutes a
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, cruel and
unusual punishment,

am1 a violation of the First Amendment.

However, appellant cites no viable authority in support of her
constitutional challenges.

The state will respond to each of

-2-

issues infra.

--,1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts of this case demonstrate the following:
1.

On March 4, 1982, a Search Warrant for the film "Ms.

Magnificence" was issued by the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, Judge
of the Fifth Circuit Court.
2.

The film "Ms. Magnificence" described in the Affidavit

for Search Warrant was seized on March 4, 1982.
3.

A Class A misdemeanor Information was filed againt

Appellant-Amicone, in Circuit Court Salt Lake Department, Case
No. 82 CRS 645,

for knowingly distributing pornographic material,

in violation of Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code Ann. 1953.
4.

(R-20).

On July 6, 1982, the appellant entered an informed and

voluntary plea of guilty to the charge of knowingly distributing
an obscene motion picture in violation of Section 76-10-1204
U.C.A.

(R-3, 6-7).

5.

Prior to appellant's plea of guilty, the full

ramifications of the plea were explained, together with all
possible penalties and the minimum mandatory fine and jail
sentence.

This voluntary plea of guilty complied with the

reouirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

(R-6,

7).

6.

The appellant arqued,

which occurred on August 30,

in connection with sentencing

1982, that the minimum mandatory

1ail sentence required by 76-10-1204(2) was unconstitutional.

-3-

This argument was rejected by the Court ancl a fine of $lll00 wi1s
imposed, together with one year in the County jail.
suspended all but seven days of the jail sentence.
7.

The Court
(R-3, 5-7).

On appeal to the Third District Court, Appellant-

Amicone's argument was rejected in an opinion by the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson.

The Court held that the sentencing statute

is "a vali0 leqislative enactment, that it is not an intrusion
into the judicial function by the Legislature nor is it a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine."

(R-60-62).

Attached as Appendix "B".
8.

Appellant then instituted this appeal before the Court.
ARGUMENT
SECTION 76-10-1204(2), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
WHICH REOUIRES A MINIMUM MANDATORY JAIL
SENTENCE FOR KNOWINGLY DISTRIBUTING OBSCENE
MATERIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES NOT
ABRIDGE ANY RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE
CONSTITUTION OF EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR
THE STATE OF UTAH.

A.

THE MANDATORY SENTENCING REQUIREMENT OF §7610-1204 ( 2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS.

The Appellant-Amicone has alleged that the statutory
reouirement of a minimum mandatory sentence is an intrusion into
a judicial function by the legislature, and therefore a violation
of the separation of powers cloctrine.

However,

this argument has

been almost universally rejected by the courts; this rejection is
particularly true of matters not involving the death penalty.
Nearly seventy years ago the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated

-4-

, 1,,c

lonq stanninq principle in Ex Parte United States 1 that the

"'atter of providing for crimes and their punishment is a
Jr:qislative function.

The Court cautioned against unwarranted

junicial intrusion into the legislative area in the following
lanquage:
"If it be that the plain legislative command
fixing a specific punishment for crime is subject
to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial
power upon considerations extraneous to the
legality of the conviction, it would seem
necessarily to follow that there could be likewise
implied a discretionary authority to permanently
refuse to try a criminal charge because of the
conclusion that a particular act made criminal by
law ought not to be treated as criminal. And thus
it would come to pass that the possession by the
judicial department of power to permanently refuse
to enforce a law would result in the destruction
of the conceded powers of the other departments,
and hence leave no law to be enforced."
Id. at
42.
This principle has been strictly adhered to for decades by
the courts of this country.
~ppellate

In State v. Motley, 2 the Missouri

Court rejected the defendant's contention that a state

statute imposing a 10-year minimum mandatory sentence for
narcotic sales, without the possibility of probation or a
suspPnded sentence, usurped judicial functions in violation of
the state's constitution.

The court also rejected the contention

!licit the court has inherent power to grant or deny probation to a
,,, l

1

c't

fsl

2J2 U.S.

of fender.

27,

The court noted that fixing punishment for a

37 S.Ct. 72 (1916).

2 '.H, :c.1:.2a 435 (1976, Mo.App.).
-5-

crime defined by statute is the province of the lenislature, not
the courts.
The court concluded that there had been no usurpation of
judicial authority and indicated that it would be a judicial
invasion of legislative power for the courts to refuse to impose,
at least, the minimum mandatory sentence.

The court held:

"Thus, the legislature by statutory enactment
described crimes and prescribes punishment and for
a court to refuse imposition of prescribed
penalties by the device of indefinite suspension
of sentence or similar means, would constitute
judicial usurpation of legislative power.
It is
clear that contrary to defendant's contention--there has been no usurpation of judicial authority
here; indeed the opposite would occur if a court
on conviction refused imposition or ordered
indefinite suspension of sentence." Id. at 438.
(Emphasis added).
In Banks v. State, 3 the Florida Supreme Court held that a
minimum 25 year imprisonment for sexual battery was not
excessive, cruel, or unusual;
usurp judicial authority.

it specifically held it did not

Quoting an earlier Florida case, the

Court said:
"'The determination of maximum and minimum
penalties to be imposed for violation of the laws
remains a matter for the legislature.'" Id. at
470.
(Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Florida has also held a mandatory
minimum 3-year sentence for conviction of aggravated assault,
where a firearm is used, to be constitutional.

3 342 S. 2d 469 (Fla. 1977).
-6-

The Court held:

"This Court has long held, and now reaffirms its
holding, that where a sentence is one that has
been established by the legislature and is not on
its face cruel and unusual, it will be sustained
when attacked on arounds of due process, equal
protection, or separation of power theories • • .
we do not find the mandatory three-year sentence
provision to be cruel or unusual."
Sowell v.
State, 342 S.2d 969 (Fla., 1977) (Emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 4 the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts held that a mandatory minimum jail sentence of one
year for first time offenders is not unconstitutional.
so held and rejected contentions of:

The Court

cruel and unusual punish-

ment, denial of due process, equal protection and violation of
separation of powers.
Referring to the separation of powers argument,

the Court

observed:
"The ability to defer the imposition of sentence,
although a valuable feature in our legal system,
is not necessary to the very existence of a court,
and, as such, is not an inherent power beyond
statutory limitation.
"The logic of this position is demonstrated by
considering that in our tripartite system of
government it is unquestionable that the
Legislature has the authority to determine what
conduct shall be punishable and to prescribe
penalties.
Although it is the court's
function to impose sentences upon conviction, it
is for the Legislature to establish criminal
sanctions and, as one of its options, it may
prescribe a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment." ..!._£. at 177 (Emphasis added).
This same Massachusetts law regarding a mandatory minimum

4

344 N.E.2d

166 (Mass. 1976).
-7-

sentence was upheld as constitutional in McQuoid v. Smith. 5
Here, in a case upholding a mandatory one year sentence for
carrying a fire arm, the court ruled this statute did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State respectfully submits that the determination of the
type of sentence to be imposed for criminal violation is a
legislative matter.

The seven day minimum and one year maximum

jail sentence is well within the prerogative of the legislature.
It, thus, does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
B.

THE MANDATORY JAIL SENTENCE REQUIREMENT OF
§76-10-1204(2) DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

Appellant alleges that the sentence imposed here is cruel
and unusual.

In so doing the appellant relies heavily upon a

recent Supreme Court decision, Solem v. Helm 6 .

In Solem the

Court held that the Eighth Amendment proscribed the imposition of
a life sentence, under South Dakota's recidivest statute, without
possibility of parole for a seventh non-violent felony.

The

court's holding was specifically limited to the circumstances of
that case and did not address the "general validity of sentences
without possibility of parole." 7
The court in Solem held that criminal sentences must be
5 556 F.2d 595 (1st Circuit, 1977).
6

U.S.

77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).

7 Id. footnote 24.
-8-

l'"i-t

"<1r t

ionate to the criminal offense involved.

However, the

also stressed the importance of deferring to the

JPoislative enactment of criminal offenses and penalties.

The

court held:
"In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a
criminal sentence must be proportionate to the
crime for which the defendant has been
convicted.
Reviewing courts, of course, should
orant substantial deference to the broad authority
that legislatures necessarily possess in
determining the types and limits of punishments
for crimes, as well as to the discretion that
trial courts possess in sentencing convicted
criminals." Id. at 649.
(Emphasis added).
The Court specifically did not overrule its earlier
decision, Rummel v. Estelle, 8 where a life sentence for a third
non-violent felony was upheld; rather the Court expressly limited
its holding in Solem to the circumstances of that case.

Further,

the Court emphasized the role of legislatures in establishing
sentences as follows:
"We agree, therefore, that, '[o) utside the context
of capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of particular sentences [will
be] exceedingly rare,'.

* * *
"[W)e do not adopt or imply approval of a general
rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent
specific authority, it is not the role of an
appellate court to substitute its judgment for
!Jiat of the sentencing court as to the
appropriateness of a particular sentence; rather,
in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate
court decides only whether the sentence under

B4 4 c-, r_1 • S • 2 6 3

(1980 ) •

-9-

review is within constitutional limits.
In view
of the substantial defenence that must be accorded
legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing
court rarely will be required to enqage in
extended analysis to determine that a sentence is
not constitutionally disproportionate."
Id. at
649, and footnote 16 (Emphasis added}.
The Court listed the following criteria for deterrninina
whether the proportionality of a sentence for Eighth Amendment
purposes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment:
gravity of the offense,

( 1}

the

(2) sentences imposed on other criminals

in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences for the same crime in
other jurisdictions.

9

The sentence imposed upon the Appellant-

Amicone meets each of these elements.
First, The gravity of unlawfully distributing obscene
material of the crime is recognized by virtually all jurisdictions and punished accordingly.

In Hunt v. State, lO the

Oklahoma Appellate Court addressed the issues of cruel and
unusual punishment, and legislative purpose.

The defendant was

charged with the sale of obscene motion pictures, an offense
similar to that of the Appellant-Amicone.

In Hunt the defendant

contended that the imposed sentence for distributing obscene
material was excessive, cruel and unusual.
The Court rejected the argument and held:
"The appellant's seventh assignment of error is
that the punishment imposed upon her was at the

9

~. at 649, 650.

l0601 P.2d 464 (Okla. Cr., 1979).
-10-

Jeast excessive and could constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
Title 21 O.S.1971, §1040.51,
under which the appellant was charged, provides
for a maximum punishment of 15 years' imprisonment
and/or a fine of $25,000.00.
She received a
sentence of three years' imprisonment and a fine
of $15,000.00.
In her brief, the appellant
asserts that Oklahoma is the only state in the
United States providing for a possible sentence
greater than seven years for an obscenity
violation and that half the states have maximum
punishments of one year or less.
She also claims
that 41 states impose a fine of $5,000.00 or less
and 30 states impose a fine of $1,000.00 or
less".
While these data do indicate that
Oklahoma's ohscenitv laws are severe, this is the
sort of arqument one would make to the Legislature
in seeking to have the law changed, rather than to
this Court in seekinq to have a conviction under
the law voided.
Severe is not cruel.
To
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, a penalty
must serve no valid leqislative purpose.
Furman
v. Georqia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 s.ct. 2726, 33
L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), Justice Marshall concurring.
We believe that the penalty provided by Section
1040.51 indicates that Oklahoma Legislature's
great concern to put a halt to obscenity traffic
in Oklahoma.
Clearly, this is a valid legislative
purpose."
Id. at 467.
(Emphasis added).
The Court reduced the sentence to one year and $5,000 on other
grounds.
The gravity with which Utah's Legislature views the
distrihution of obscene material and the maximum penalty imposed
for the offense,

is similar to the majority of other state

Jurisdictions, as referenced in Hunt, supra.
',1w 1 ,
11

,in

offense has repeatedly been held to be a valid

ll' lative matter.

lll-:J arnma

The punishment of

As noted above,

the constitutionality of

's statute, which provides for up to 15 years

1r~r1~0nment

for selling obscene material, has been upheld

-1 1-

against a challenge alleging the sentence constitutec1 cruel anrl
unusual punishment, Hunt, supra.
Appellant continually attempts to discount the gravity of
the admitted offense by referring to it as "minor", "not
serious", and havinq no "specific victim".

However the U.S.

Supreme Court and the State legislature have determined
otherwise. 11

The legislature has specifically provided that:

"It is not a defense to prosecution . • • that the
actor was-a motion picture projectionist, usher,
ticket-taker,
. or otherwise was required to
violate any provision of this part incident to his
employment." Section 76-10-1208 ( 2) (Emphasis
added).
Further, the Appellant admitted responsibility for the
film's exhibition.

Her actions specifically included receipt of

funds from customers, and the knowledge of what the film
contained.

Those actions were an integral part of the now

admitted unlawful distribution of obscene material.
Owner's of businesses which exhibit explicit material do not
make themselves easily available to answer for the showing of
allegedly obscene material.

The Legislature, well aware of this

process, properly included all knowing participants in the
distribution of obscene material and subjected them to a
mandatory jail sentence when the offense is proven.
Second, mandatory jail sentences are also required under
Utah law for:

inducing the acceptance of pornographic material,

1 1 Paris , infra, Id . at 5 5- 5 9 c i t ec1 p. 1 8 here i n.
-12-

"J0-1205(2); dealing

in material harmful to minors, 76-10-

1106(3) and (4); and indecent public displays, 76-10-1228, all
Utah Code Annotated., 1953 as amended.
In addition, a review of sentences which have been imposed
for er iminal offenses of this statute is set forth in part C, of
the State's brief, infra at 16-17.
Third, other jurisdictions impose similar or greater
penalties to Utah's one year maximum sentence for the unlawful
distribution of obscene material, Hunt, supra.

Further, contrary

to Appellant's assertion, Utah is not the only state which
imposes a mandatory jail sentence for first time offenders.
Tennessee provides for a mandatory 60 day incarceration without
possibility of suspension for those convicted of distributing
obscene material.

A copy of Tennessee's statute is attached as

Appendix "C".
It is therefore submitted, that the mandatory seven day jail
term under Utah law is not constitutionally disproportionate to
the crime involved when measured against the Solem criteria, nor
does it constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
C.

THE MANDATORY JAIL SE~TENCE PROVIDED FOR IN
SECTION 76-10-1204(2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
PROVISIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

The appellant contends that the mandatory jail sentence
requirements of Utah law for the unlawful distribution of obscene
material constitute a denial of due process and freedom of speech
under the lltah anrl United States Constitutions.
-13-

This contention

finds no support whatever in any leqislative enartrnPnt nor ifl th<
authoritative pronouncement of any court.
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently helrl
that obscene material has absolutely no protection under the
law.

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 12 the Supreme Court

observed:
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem.
These include
the lewd and obscene.
. . It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
sliqht social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
Id. at 571, 572.
(Emphasis
added).
The Court held in Roth v. United States 13 :
"We hold that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press."
Id.
at 485.
And in the landmark obscenity case, Miller v. California, 14 the
court held:
"This much has been categorically settled by the
Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the
First Amendment."
Id. at 23.
It is true that material, before it is found to be obscene,
enjoys constitutional protection.

However, that protection ends

12 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942).
13 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957).
14 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
-1 4-

"a rletermination or an unqualified admission that the
i11c1tf'r:-ial

There is no continuing protection beyond

is obscene.

such determination to either the material or the exhibitor of the
material, Miller,

supra.

In the present case,

the appellant admitted that the

material, a motion picture entitled "Ms. Magnificence", was
oh•cene and that she was guilty of its exhibition.

Appellant's

plea of guilty totally removed any "dim and uncertain line" which
may have existed as to the ohscenity of the material.
Appellant suggests that whether material is obscene is
completely a matter of
such material.

"guessing" on behalf of those who deal in

If such were the case,

the obscenity legislation

suggested in Miller v. California, supra and enacted by the Utah
Legislature in 76-10-1201, et seq. U.C.A. would have been held
unconstitutionally vague.
However,

in State v. Haig, 15 this Court upheld the State's

ohscenity against constitutional challenges of overbreadth and
vagueness.

This finding was reaffirmed in State v. Pierren, 16

and in State v. Eagle Book. 17
More recently,

this Court addressed the issue of the

ronstitutionality of the obscenity statute and the question of

1 ', '> 7 fO
16

p. 2d 837

583 P.2d 69

1 7 :-, /"; -~

p. 2rl 73

(Utah,

19 7 8).

(Utah,

1978).

(Utah,

19 7 p).
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punishment under Section 76-10-1204(2).

The Court held:

"Our statute thus complies fully with the
requirements set out by the high Court.
It does
not offend against any constitutional provision.
It is a valid statute and those who so flagrantly
flout it must pay the penalty for doing so."
State v. Piepenburg, 602 P.2d 702, at 704 (Utah,
1979) (Emphasis added).
Had the court imposed a more severe sentence of one year in
jail the appellant's free speech challenge and all other
constitutional challenges would have evaporated.

Yet, the far

more lenient sentence, seven days and $1000, is so challenged
simply because it coincides with the minimum sentence specified
in the statute.

Appellant's contention is without merit, as

evidenced by the lack of any authoritative precedent to support
the assertion.
Argumentatively, appellant suggests to the Court that the
mandatory jail sentence will result in the elimination of all
protected material of a sexual nature, and that it also
eliminates all judicial discretion in imposing sentences.

This

alarmist approach is totally unsupported and contradicted by
fact.

Many employees of the Studio Theatre have served mandatory

jail sentences pursuant to the statute here under attack.

Yet,

there has been no indication that that establishment is inclined
to show other than sexually oriented material.
For example, James Piepenburg, the defendant in State v.

-16-

,,,~i><:rihuro,
,,1 1 1ch

18

was the president and a director of the corporation

operated the Studio Theatre.

Piepenburg was charged and

.. onv icted under the same section of the state law at issue here,
and he was sentenced to six months in jail with three months
suspended.
Randy Taylor,

former manager of the Studio Theatre, was also

convicted and sentenced under this same statute and ultimately
served 90 days in jail. 19

other managers of this theatre have

served jail sentences of 15 days and many other employees, like
the appellant, have served the minimum mandatory jail term
required by the statute. 20
The foregoing demonstrates the fallacy of appellant's
"chilling effect" argument.

It also demonstrates that sentencing

Courts use discretion in imposing sentences, which reflect
various mitigating factors and responsibility for the particular
offense involved.
The reasons for the existence and firm enforcement of
obscenity legislation were pointed out in the landmark case of
Paris Adult T~eatre v. Slaton. 21

18

19

602 P.2d 702,

705

state of Utah v.

The Supreme Court, after

(Utah, 1979).
Randy Taylor, 78 CRS 341.

'°-state of lJtah v . .Joyce Vigil, 79 CRS 983; State of Utah v.
A. King, 81 CHS 351; State of Utah v. Gary Lee Hill and
Marilyn Oldrnvd, CR 78-648.
J0mes

ll413 U.S.

49

(1973).
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rejecting the argument that showinq pornoaraphic films to
"consenting adults" is immune from state regulation, made these
incisive comments:
"In particular, we hold that there are legitimate
state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity, .
These include the
interest of the public in the equality of life and
the total community environment, the tone of
commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly
the public safety itself.
. however, there
remains one problem of large propcrtions aptly
described by Professor Bickel:
"'It concerns the tone of the society, the mode,
or to use terms that have perhaps greater
currency, the style and quality of life, now and
in the future.
Even supposing that each of
us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye
and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot),
what is commonly read and seen and heard and done
intrudes upon us all, want it or not.'
22 The
Public Interest 25-26 (Winter 1971).
"As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a
'right of the Nation and of the States to maintain
a decent society .
Id. at 58-59.
(Emphasis added).
The State submits that the right to punish the distribution
of obscene material extends to the right of the legislature to
impose a mandatory penalty for such crime.

Such a penalty does

not violate the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Appellant-Amicone's conviction for a class A misdemeanor wa
potentially punishable by a fine of $1000 and one year in
jail. 22

Yet the Appellant was merely given seven days in iail

22 76-3-204 and 76-3-301 Utah CodP Ann.,
-18-

1953.

,,,J,.rPrl
• 1 .1

t" pciv a $1000 fine.

Such a sentence can hardly be

tn he excessive or disproportionate.

The leqislature of the State of Utah has very clearly
1

nrlicated the gravity with which it views the crime of

d1str ihlltinq pnrno9raphy.
prnalty for a first

In addition to the mandatory minimum

time conviction,

the legislature has made

c11!->S>cJUent obscenity Offenses felonies,
suspcri.=;inn

nf

sentence.

without possibility Of

Mandatory sentences, without suspension

ha'.'e

,11.;o been mandated

for other fJtah crimes.

ha~e

alsn been imposed by other jurisdictions.

Similar penalties

The mandatory sentencing provision of 76-10-1204(2} Utah
~dP

Af1_12,.,

lg53 is fully constitutional and reflects the judgment

nf thP legislature.

It

is respectfully submitted that the

constitutionality of the statute should be upheld and the
sentence of the Apoellant he affirmed.
DATED this

day of September, 1983.

ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
Assistant City Attorney

STANLEY H. OLSEN
Assistant Citv Prosecutor
Attorneys for-Plaintiff-Respondent
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CITY ATTORNEY'S OFF:CE
DA1E

I 11 L

.\TTOE~EY GENERAL
~TAl'E OF TJT All

.y)!?JS:3.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

PAUL M. TINKER

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

September 8, 1983

FRAXKLYK B MATHESQS, GH!El'
Governmentel Affeo~ Oov•soon

ROBERT R WALL.ACE, Gmr.:P'

L1t1getion 01111s1on

'ft1WAM: T. EVANS. Caru·

Roger F. Cutler
Salt Lake City Attorney
100 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Humen Re!!.ource"' Q,v1s1on

DOS.UD S GOLEMA...". CHIE.l'

Pi'iys•cel Re'!>ource~ Q,,,,9,cn

~1;.p~J~n;?~~'.,';o1 ~~~6~~1,~

State of Utah v. Heather
Supreme Court No. 19183

s.

Amicone

Dear Roger:
As you may be aware, the defendant in the referenced
matter has appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on the basis of
the alleged unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1204
( 19 53) .
It is my understanding that your off ice represented
the State in Circuit and District Courts pursuant to the
authority of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1953).
The defendant
pleaded guilty in Circuit Court and subsequently appealed a
mandatory jail sentence imposed by that court.
The Third District Court by Judge Wilkinson found
the statute constitutional and this appeal followed.
I would be grateful if your office would continue to
assist us in the handling of this matter at the Supreme Court
including preparation of the brief and the presentation of oral
arguments.
Sincerely,
~

"-t:}~
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

cc:
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\ l) 1

Geoffrey Butler
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APPENDIX 'B "

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LA.KE COutlTY, STATE OF UTAH
51'\TF: OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

DECISIOll

\' s
: . ··"· S.

CRHlINAL NO. CRA 82-52

?J<I COI<E,
Defend2nt/Appcll~nt

.

..... :.'o'·,,·cn::itled r".2tte:- co::-es before the Court on appeal

._\..

-

. :

~' -

t : h d2

Subse~uent
l

0

·-1~ ~,

L

]

t\

igp,:_:,

thL! Court

JiWJ.00 ,,·it~c one
[.2

suc:pcnded.

•~ntencc

~,e::ntenced

,.

0

f

J '-' 1 :: '

thereto on the 30th day

th2 defendant to pay a fine of

vear in jail, all but seven days of jail sentence
Defendant's appeal is based on (1) the mandatory

requirement of the Utah Code Section 76-10-1201, et seq are

unconstitutional incursions on judicial authority;

(2) the mandatory

scn:cnce provision of the Utah Code Section 76-10-1201, et seq violate Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
ha~~

· :l

submitted a brief covering the questions of law,

Both parties
the Court having

the s:1me and nov 11eing fully advised in the premises renders its
1un.

1

1

195] as amended, is constitutional and is a valid

s]dtive enactment,

that it is not an intrusion into the

function by the Legislature,

nor is it a violation

thl· separation of powers doctrine.

See Cc2mom..·ealth vs.

.~icidl

,r

d,

DECISION

finds thal Section 76-10-1204(2), Utah Code

('"ql't
;1,

PACE TWO

;" 11I.I1·;:

\'~

dson,

344 N.E.2d 166, Mass.

S ~-~d 435,
·; 0

.

"d 595,

Mo.

1977.

S~ith,

The Court further finds

the

imposed by Section 76-10-1204(2)

---,Jatn:\' j2il sentence as

0: Cue process c3nd freedoD of sreech UTtder

2 d1~Tiic~

; (1f

State vs. Motlev,

1976, and McOuoid vs.

App.

1st Cir.

1976;

See 1-'.iller vs.

l

_,J~L'(~

e._';1

q3

s

Ct

l' ;ii c: £.CL 5_ l_9_t_ ''-2 .

'
35

t11c fc)rC't~.0in~',

the Court

.,-

- · " \',.

.

',

"nrl a;·ciinst the

Cncuit Court,

'

l j

l'

defendant,

5 t- c:
L.

~

(

.,

( (J

7 ( l q 73)

c

(~

.

~

l

~'\

;

cr:~r-li~s~:y

(}

: ) ;

-:::-,__i

L1 S . 4 76 , 77 S . Ct . 1 3 0 4 ( 1 9 5 7) .
finc~s

in fn\ 0r 0[ the plaintiff
1

and sustains the ;.entcncin~- of the

.:md remands the rBttcr l.Jacl-. to

the Circuit Court

ror imposition of the sentence.

:.Jat<?d this

/(J~

day of March,

1983.
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APPENDIX "C"
" (a)
It sh al 1 be unlawful to knowingly send or
cause to be sent, or bring or cause to be brought,
into this state for sale, distribution, exhibition, or display, or in this state to prepare for
distribution, publish, print, exhibit, distribute,
or offer to distribute, or to possess with intent
to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute
any obscene matter.
It shall be unlawful to
direct, present, or produce any obscene theatrical
production, peep shows or live performance and
every person who participates in that part of such
production which renders said production or
performance obscene is guilty of said offense.
"(b)

Notwithstanding any of the provisions of
39-6-1115, the distribution of
obscene matter to minors shall be governed by §396-1131 et seq.
In case of any conflict between
tho provisions of §§39-6-1101 - 39-6-1115 and §396-1131 et seq., the provisions of the latter shall
prevail as to minors.

§§39-6-1001 -

"(c)
It shall be unlawful to hire, employ, or use
a minor to do or assist in doing any of the acts
described in subsection (a) with knowledge that a
person is a minor under eighteen (18) years of
age, or while in possession of such facts that he
or she should reasonably know that such person is
a minor under eighteen (18) years of age.
"(d)(l)
Any person who violates the provisions of
this section shall, upon conviction of the first
such offense, be guilty of a misdemeanor and be
punished by imprisonment in the county jail or
workhouse for a period of sixty (60) days.
"(2)
Any person who violates the provisions of
this section and who has been convicted of one (1)
prior violation of this section shall, upon
conviction of the second such offense, be guilty
of a mi~rlcrneanor and be punished by imprisonment
in the· C•'crnty jail or workhouse for a period of
eleven ( ) J i months and twenty-nine (29) days.
" ( 3)
'"". peer son who violates the provisions of
this 5'·ct1nn anrl who has been convicted of at
leilc·c•. t·"''" ( 2) prior violations of this section
shc~1~

1

ur)-,'.'"

c_·r_H1\1

iction of

the

thirc1 nr- subsequent

be guilty of a felony and be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a definite
term of not less than two (2) years nor rrore than
five (5) years.

0ffen~e.

"(e)(l)
For purposes of this subsection, a Class
A violator shall be any person sentenced under the
provisions of subsection (d) who distributes
obscene books, magazines, newspapers, pictures,
drawings, photographs or other printed or written
material when such obscene material represents
twenty-five percent (25%) or less of the stock-intrade, and inventory, and sales of such violator
during any given twenty-four (24) hour period.
A
Class B violator shall be any other person
sentenced under the provisions of subsection (d)
who is not defined as a Class A violator.
Upon
application for sentencing as a Class A violator,
as defined above, such violator shall have the
burden of proving his classification.
"(2) The sentences imposed in subsection (d) of
this section shall be mandatory for a Class B
violator, and no Class B violator sentenced under
the provisions of such subsection shall be
eligible for suspension of sentence and probation,
release on parole, or any other program whereby
such person enjoys the privilege of supervised or
unsupervised release into the community or whereby
such person is released, permanently or
temporarily, prior to the expiration of his
sentence, including, but not limited to,
participation in any programs authorized by §§4121-208 or 41-21-227.
Provided, further, no Class
B violator sentenced under subsection (d) of this
section shall receive good, honor or incentive
time credit towaros the expiration of such
sentence as authorized by §§41-21-212, 41-21-214
or 41-21-228; nor shall such sentence expire in
any other manner until it has been entirely served
day for day.
rr74
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